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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-FEDEAL CouRT or APPEALS Loox s
To FEDERAL LAW TO DEmIE "BitcBH" Ix STATUTE INcoRPoRAT-
ING STATE LAw
After the Comptroller of the Currency had indicated his intention
to approve an application for a charter to operate a new national bank
which would be closely affiliated with an existing national bank,1 plaintiff
Camden Trust Company, which operated a branch bank in the same
locality, sued to enjoin the Comptroller's proposed action. Camden Trust
contended that since the new bank would be a branch the application fell
within the scope of section 36(c) of the National Bank Act which allows
the Comptroller to charter a branch only if the statutory law of the state
would permit a state bank to establish a similar branch 2 The State of
New Jersey, intervening as amicus curiae, maintained that the proposed
bank would be characterized as a branch were it to apply for a state
charter, and would not be chartered by the state.3 The District Court for
the District of Columbia rejected these contentions and granted summary
judgment for the Comptroller. The court of appeals, one judge dissenting,
affirmed, holding that the new bank was an affiliate, not a branch within
the meaning of section 36(c). The dissent argued that approval of the
new bank would offend the substance of the statutory restrictions because
the characteristics of the new bank were so similar to those of a branch.
Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney, 301 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 886 (1962).
Originally both the federal and state banking systems disfavored
branching,4 but the growth of bank holding companies 5 encouraged the
proliferation of the very evils against which the prohibitions of branching
were directed-centralization and absentee management. 6 Since the parent
in a parent-branch relationship is financially more responsible than a parent
lApproval of an application is a two-step process. After informal approval has
been given, the applicant must fill out additional forms. When these are executed,
the formal Charter is granted. 12 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1959). Approval is not final until
the official certificate has been issued. Cf. National Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank,
252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
248 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §36(c) (1958).
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-19(B) (Supp. 1961) prohibits branching in a town-
ship where another bank has previously been established and where the parent bank
does not have its principal office. See notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text.
4 See LAwRENCE, BANKING CONCENTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 233-40 (1930);
OSTROLENK, ECONOMICS OF BRANCH BANKING 86-87 (1930).
5 See Legislation Note, 48 HARV. L. REv. 659, 663-68 (1935).
6 See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1093, 1094-96 (1957). See generally HoGElsoN, THE
ECONOMICS OF GRouP BANKING 9-13 (1955).
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holding company,7 a number of states preferred the lesser evil and liberal-
ized their branching restrictions.8 At the same time-1925-1933-pressure
increased to permit national banks to branch.9 In 1927 Congress passed
the McFadden Act which allowed national banks to branch in states which
permitted branching; I0 this did not satisfy the proponents of branch bank-
ing who wanted authority for national banks to branch independently of
state restrictions. 1  The National Bank Act of 1933, however, again re-
jected this approach in favor of maintaining the equality between the
federal and state systems which had developed through years of parallel
growth.'2  Section 36(c) of the act permits national banks to branch only
if the state in which the bank is located would explicitly permit similar
branching by a state bank.
13
Crucial to the decision of the present case was a determination whether
an affiliate falls within the category of an independent bank, which can
be chartered in the complete discretion of the Comptroller,' 4 or within the
category of branch in section 36(c), which permits approval only if state
banking laws explicitly allow such a branch.15 In declining to call the
new bank a branch, the present court pointed out that an affiliate has a
separate corporate structure with all the incidents of separate incorpora-
tion, whereas a branch does not; moreover, transactions between affiliated
banks are more closely regulated than transactions between parent and
branch. The court also emphasized that affiliates are not included in the
definition of branch in section 36(f) and that Congress has recognized a
distinction between branches and affiliates in other sections of the National
Bank Act-at least for purposes of regulation. 16 When the policies behind
branching restrictions are considered, however, the distinction between
branch and affiliate becomes less clear than the court assumed. 17 Chains
7 See generally LAWRENcE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 59-80.
8 See Westerfield, The Banking Act of 1933, 41 J. PoL. EcoN. 721, 742 (1933);
Legislation Note, supra note 5, at 661.
9 See 76 CONG. REc. 1998-2026 (1933); CHAPMAN & WESTERFIELD, BRANC H
BANKING 116-23 (1942).
10 McFadden Act § 7, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1958).
31 See note 9 .rpra.
12 See CHAPMAN & WESTERFIELD, BRANcH BANKING 118-20, 135-38 (1942); cf.
LAWRENCE, op. cit. . upra note 4, at 94-95.
1348 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1958).
'442 Stat. 621 (1922), 12 U.S.C. § 1 (1958); REv. STAT. § 5168 (1875), as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 26 (Supp. II 1960). Courts have refrained from questioning
the exercise of this discretion. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Murray, 212 Fed. 140 (8th
Cir. 1914) ; Community Nat!l Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
15 If the Comptroller approves the application of a national bank to branch in
a locality where a state branch could not be established, issuance of the charter may
be enjoined. E.g., National Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
36 Instant case at 524.
17 Cf. CHAPMAN & WESTERFIELD, op. cit. .supra note 9, at 323-24. See generally
HOGENSoiN, THE ECONOMICs OF GROUP BANKING 177-79 (1955).
1160 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110
of affiliates may centralize banking control and lead to absentee manage-
ment as readily as branching.'8 In any event, the court's attempt to use
the regulatory sections' distinction between branches and affiliates in inter-
preting the section governing entry seems unjustified. Legislative history
indicates that the primary congressional concern was to preserve the
equality between the federal and state banking systems.19 If the purpose
of section 36(c) is to prevent national bank expansion where state bank
expansion is prohibited, then state law should be examined to determine
the characterization of a proposed bank.
Before the passage of legislation authorizing national bank branching,
the Supreme Court held that state law applied by state courts could prevent
a national bank from branching.2 0 The Court stated broadly that a national
bank is subject to state laws which do not interfere with the purpose of its
creation, destroy its efficiency as a federal agency, or conflict with federal
law.2 1 The force of that rule could only have been strengthened by the
subsequent passage of a statute explicitly requiring the Comptroller to
look to state law in branching cases. 22 Courts have looked to state law
to define other terms in section 36 2 and to define terms in other statutes
that do not refer explicitly to state law.2 Arguments for ignoring state
definitions here are not persuasive. Although use of state standards would
introduce a lack of uniformity into the national banking system, section
36(c) has already injected this element. And even if application of broad
state definitions of branch would impair the ability of the national banking
system to stimulate competition in areas where it is stifled by state re-
strictions, 25 these considerations are for Congress which presumably did
18 Compare authorities cited note 6 spra. The parent in the present case, for
example, after two abortive attempts to branch, was willing to establish an affiliate.
Brief for the State of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae, instant case, p. 8.
'9 See, e.g., Willis, The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation, 35 CoLum. L. REv.
697, 703-04 (1935); Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1093, 1094-96 (1957).
20 First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924). It is interesting to note
the definition of branch proposed in that case by counsel for the United States:
A branch bank, as . . . used . . . by the office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, partakes of the nature of a primary organization . . . . It
is to many intents and purposes an additional bank under the same board
of directors, closely associated with the parent bank, but operating in most
matters independently.
Id. at 648-49. The proposed bank in the present case fits this definition perfectly.
2 1 Id. at 656.
2 One lower federal court has said in a recent decision:
[T]he apparent purpose of Congress [is] to have exactly the same standards
-state law-apply to the establishment of national bank branches as apply to
the establishment of state bank branches.
Commercial State Bank v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770, 775 (D.D.C. 1959), aff'd per
curiam, 278 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
2 3 First Nat'l Bank v. First Bank Stock Corp., 197 F. Supp. 417, 423 (D. Mont.
1961) (definition of state bank).
24 E.g., United States v. Cambridge Loan & Bldg. Co., 278 U.S. 55 (1928)
(definition of building and loan association).
25 See Stokes, Public Convenience and Advantage in Applications for New Banks
and Branches, 74 BANKING L.J. 921 (1957); Note, 71 YALE L.J. 502-04, 514-16
(1962).
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not find them sufficiently persuasive to overcome the policy of reference to
state law. The failure of Congress to include affiliate in its definition of
branch in section 36(f) might be read as excluding affiliates from the
reach of section 36(c). But if the omission was intentional it can as well
be argued that since in other sections of the banking statutes Congress
explicitly provided for affiliates when it wished to distinguish them from
branches,2 16 the omission of explicit provisions in section 36 evinces an
intent not to distinguish between affiliates and branches for purposes of
that section. Actually the omission was probably inadvertent 27 in which
case the proper approach is to look to the underlying congressional policy
in section 36-the preservation of the equality of the federal and state
systems.28 Achievement of results consistent with this policy requires
reference to state law for the purpose of defining branch.29
Even though the court in the present case failed to apply or even look
to state law, the result is not necessarily inconsistent with it. New Jersey's
only authority for its contention that the proposed bank would be char-
acterized as a branch under its law 3 0 was a statement by the State Com-
missioner of Banking and Insurance that he would not charter a state
bank that was to be run by the same management and under the same
policies as the parent bank.31 On the other hand, the Commissioner had
previously approved an application for the establishment of an affiliate,
noting however his belief that the affiliated banks would be managed inde-
pendently.32 It is difficult to determine whether the Commissioner feels
bound by state law to reject applications to operate affiliates which will not
be managed independently or whether the Commission rejects such ap-
plications as a matter of discretion. In an area which is committed to
the discretion of a federal agency, a federal court need not defer to a state
officer's discretion.33 Therefore, the present court may have reached the
correct result, but it did so without the seemingly necessary examination
of state law at least to determine whether the state characterization was
mandatory or discretionary. The court did examine the federal law char-
acterization for the proposed bank, implying that the definition of branch
is a matter of federal law. Since the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia is the usual forum for appeals involving the Comptroller of the
2 6 See, e.g., REv. STAT. § 5211 (1875), as amended 12 U.S.C. § 161(c) (Supp. II
1960).
27 There is no indication of congressional intent, and the definition itself cannot
be said to have a substantive thrust. Section 36(f) defines branch to include "any
branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of
business. .. ."
28 See notes 12 and 19 supra and accompanying text.
2 9 Othervise national banks thwarted in attempts to branch can accomplish their
purpose by creation of affiliates, thus evading the policy of section 36(c). See notes
17-18 supra and accompanying text.
30 Instant case at 526 (dissenting opinion).
31 Brief for the State of New Jersey as Amincus Curiae, instant case, pp. 13, 15-16.
:32 Id. at 17-19. The Commissioner's decision is unreported.
33 Otherwise the determination may as well be vested in the State Commissioner,
whereas Congress has entrusted the decision to the federal Comptroller.
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Currency, 4 such a departure from the explicit reference to state law re-
quired by section 36(c) endangers the underlying policy of preserving the
equality of the federal and state banking systems.
CENSORSHIP-MORALITY COMMISsIoN'S ACTION in COMP=IG
LISTS OF "OBSCENE" PAPERBACK BooKs AND THREATENINTG TO
RECOMMEND PROSECUTION Or DISmTRIBUTORS HELD NOT TO INFRINGE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF FREE SPEECH
The Rhode Island General Assembly by resolution' created the
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth, whose function was to
educate the public concerning obscene publications and to investigate and
recommend prosecution for violations of the state obscenity statute. The
Commission without public hearing prepared lists of books that it con-
sidered objectionable for sale to minors; it sent the lists to book dis-
tributors in the state and threatened to recommend prosecution of any
distributor who failed to remove listed books from his stock. After a
distributor refused to handle listed paperback books, the publishers of the
books sued to enjoin the Commission's action. A lower court found the
resolution valid but held that the Commission's action constituted an un-
constitutional prior restraint. All parties appealed to the state supreme
court which reversed the lower court and held both the resolution and
the Commission's action constitutional. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
176 A.2d 393 (R.I. 1961), prob. juris. noted, 30 U.S.L. WEFK 3397 (U.S.
June 26, 1962) (No. 969).
Operating either independently or in conjunction with law enforce-
ment officials, private self-appointed groups like the well-known Watch and
Ward Society have played an important role in the struggle to curtail
obscenity.2 The present case, however, involves a morality commission
established by the state with functions and powers falling somewhere be-
tween those of a private group and those of a public prosecutor. Novel
and difficult problems are presented concerning the point at which courts
must intervene to protect constitutional guarantees. While a state may
prohibit the distribution of obscene books,3 its method of censorship is
34 Though a national bank may sue in the district in which it is located, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1394 (1958), the majority of cases in which there will be the greatest danger of
conflict between the state and federal systems will involve protesting state banks.
These banks almost invariably will have to sue in the District of Columbia. Fa. R.
Civ. P. 4(d) (5). The Supreme Court will be unlikely to review these cases, since
there would be no conflict among the circuits. See U.S. Sue. CT. R. 19.
'R.I. Acts & Resolves, Jan. 1956, Res. No. 73, at 1102, as amended, Jan. 1959,
Res. No. 95, at 880.
2 See PAUL & SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENsoRsun' 249 (1961).
3 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957).
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subject to the limitations of the first and fourteenth amendments.4 Two
recent Supreme Court cases-Marcus v. Search Warrant 5 and Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown Q-suggest that constitutionality hinges on whether
the state's method provides for a formal consideration of the obscenity
issue, but the Court has yet to outline the requisite degree of formality.
Although these cases-and all other Supreme Court obscenity cases-
involved legally binding action by a state official or agency,7 several lower
courts have invalidated mere threats of prosecution by officials.8
The Rhode Island Supreme Court based its decision on the pub-
lishers' failure to demonstrate a causal relationship between its injury and
the Commission's threats. A necessary link in the causal chain was the
independent action of the distributor whose cooperation with the Commis-
sion may have been motivated by reasons other than avoidance of prosecu-
tion. 9 However, in instances of seemingly independent intervening action,
the Supreme Court has connected the initial state action with the eventual
effect,' 0 and the trial court in the present case found that curtailment of
circulation was the "inevitable result" of the Commission's action." The
Commission itself perceived a causal connection between its threats and
the desired result '2 -the removal of listed books from distributors' shelves.
Court intervention prior to prosecution is warranted from a practical stand-
point. A distributor's profit on the sale of paperback books is so small in
relation to the expenses and dangers of criminal prosecution that fear of
prosecution and possible public disapproval will effectively remove the
books from circulation. This reasoning has supported injunctions against
threats of prosecution by prosecuting officials '3 and seems equally appli-
cable to the present case. In fact, since the danger of injury is so imminent
and since the listing of the books constitutes an invidious branding, the
4 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
5367 U.S. 717 (1961).
6 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
7 See cases cited notes 3-6 supra.
8 HMH Publishing Co. v. Garrett, 151 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ind. 1957); New
Am. Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1953);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 NJ. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47 (Ch. 1953). Although
strictly holding only that the action of the prosecutor was beyond the scope of his
authority, each court also found a deprivation of liberty or property without due
process of law and devoted a considerable portion of its opinion to the constitutional
problem. The three opinions appear to make alternate holdings of lack of authority
and violation of the due process clause. One district court has gone further by en-
joining a private organization from threatening to recommend prosecution. American
Mercury, Inc. v. Chase, 13 F.2d 224 (D. Mass. 1926). Threats by state officials
other than threats of prosecution have been enjoined. Sunshine Book Co. v. Mc-
Caffrey, 4 App. Div. 2d 643, 168 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1957), held that a threat to revoke
a license by the Commissioner of Licenses on the ground that a dealer sold indecent
books constituted a prior restraint in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
9 See instant case at 396-97.
10 See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
11 See Brief for Petitioners, pp. 16-18 (quoting trial court opinion).
12 See id. at 8-9 (quoting from Commission's Annual Report).
23 See cases cited note 8 mipra.
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publishers might be allowed to contest the constitutionality of the Com-
mission's action even before they suffer actual economic injury. In Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath '4-- a case testing the power of
the Attorney General to list organizations as subversive without notice
and hearing-the Supreme Court held that the absence of prior tangible
injury did not bar a suit when a high probability of injury was com-
pounded with invidious branding; three members of the majority held
that notice and hearing were a constitutional prerequisite to listing.' 5
Though the listing in the present case may be less injurious than the brand-
ing in Joint Anti-Fascist, it is also true that the government's interest in
curbing subversion is more substantial than the state's interest in elim-
inating obscenity. Therefore, on balance, there appears to be no justifica-
tion for a more rigid injury requirement in the present situation. And,
since in any event the publishers in the present case did suffer a tangible
injury-loss of profits from the sale of banned books-, there seems to be
no basis for the state supreme court's rejection of the trial court's finding
of a causal connection between the threats and the injury.
The critical issue, then, should have been whether the Commission's
procedure provides adequate safeguards. A state may not inhibit the
circulation of non-obscene literature; 16 therefore, suppression of literary
material must be based on an adequate determination of obscenity. 17 In
the present case the Commission purported to make such a determination
by its preparation of lists, but that method suffers from two possible con-
stitutional defects. The Supreme Court has never sanctioned censorship
by commissions; indeed in Marcus v. Search Warrant ' 8 -in which the
Court invalidated a method of non-judicial censorship-, the Court ad-
verted to the absence of a judicial determination as a relevant factor in dis-
tinguishing Kingsley Books in which a judicial method of censorship was
upheld.19 Both opinions also emphasized the importance of notice and
hearing in an obscenity proceeding without, however, making such safe-
guards determinative. The fourteenth amendment seems to require notice
and hearing for a determination of obscenity 2 0 since the interest threatened
-freedord of communication-is protected by a constitutional guarantee
that enjoys a "preferred position." 21 While the interest of the state in
14341 U.S. 123 (1951).
Is See concurring opinions of Black, J., id. at 142, Frankfurter, J., id. at 149,
and Douglas, J., id. at 174. Justice Jackson, also concurring, stated that a hearing
was required at some stage of the procedure though not necessarily prior to the listing.
Id. at 183. Justice Burton, the fifth member of the majority, would have disposed
of the case on procedural grounds without reaching the constitutional issue. Id. at 124.
16 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
17 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957).
18 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
19 d. at 734-38.
20 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (dictum).
21 See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
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shielding minors from obscene literature is also significant, the censorship
in the present case restricted adult reading as well. 2 Therefore, if com-
mission censorship is to be approved at all, the requirement of notice and
hearing with an opportunity for judicial review should be the minimum
protection accorded the fundamental freedom of communication. By re-
quiring a strict cause-and-effect relationship between censorship and finan-
cial injury, the present case permits a state to do by indirection what it
may not do directly; the very effectiveness of -the methods employed leads
to the conclusion that the absence of appropriate safeguards rendered the
Commission's action inimical to the first and fourteenth amendments.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-DISTRICT CoURT DECLINES To
APPLY STATE STATUTE OF LImiTATIONS TO ACTION -UNDER SECTION
303 OF TE LABOR MAITAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
In an action for damages brought under section 303 of the federal
Labor Management Relations Act,' defendant unions contended that a
three-year California statute of limitations 2 barred plaintiff employers'
claim. Section 303 did not include a period of limitation. The district
court declined to apply the state statute to bar the federal right, and held
that, until Congress should determine a cutting-off point for stale claims,
there was no effective time limit except for the equitable doctrine of laches
to exclude plaintiffs guilty of unconscionable delay. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engrs, 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.
Cal. 1961).
The Supreme Court has consistently held that when Congress has
failed to provide a limitations period, the Rules of Decision Act3 should
govern, and federal courts should apply appropriate state statutes of limita-
tions in federal question cases as well as in diversity cases.4 To this settled
principle there have been recognized exceptions for cases in which the
22 In such a case the argument that the method of censorship was intended to
protect minors will not suffice to avoid its invalidation on constitutional grounds.
See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
'61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1958): "Whoever shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of any violation of subsection (a) of this section
may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . ...
2 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958): "The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."
4 E.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947); McClaine v. Ranldn, 197
U.S. 154, 158 (1905); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); Blume & George,
Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MIcE. L. REV. 937, 941, 964 (1951) ; see Note,
Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 68, 74-75 (1953) ;
Note, Disparities in Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YALE L.J.
738 (1940).
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application of a state limitations period would be inconsistent with the
purposes of the federal legislation,5 would discriminate against federal
rights, 6 or would deprive claimants of a reasonable period within which to
prosecute their claims.7 The use of state statutes of limitations to bar
federally created rights has been criticized, 8 but only once, in McAllister v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co.,9 has the Supreme Court declined to use a state
period of limitation. In that case the Court held that an unseaworthiness
claim joined with an action brought under the Jones Act was so inter-
twined with the latter action that a shorter time limit could not be applied
to the unseaworthiness claim. However, the reasoning in that case seems
to be limited to the peculiar configuration of the maritime remedies.' 0
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,": dealing with the question of the law
to be applied to actions under section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, held that the necessity for uniform regulation of labor-manage-
ment relations required the federal courts to create a body of federal sub-
stantive law. An appellate decision subsequent to Lincoln Mills applied a
state limitations period to an action arising under section 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act,' 2 thus interpreting the Lincoln Mills mandate
as being limited to substantive law.
The district court in the present case sought to apply the Lincoln
Mills doctrine requiring the creation of federal substantive labor law in
order to foster uniformity.'3  However, the rationale which led the Supreme
Court to seek substantive uniformity does not extend to the present situa-
tion.'4 The alternative in Lincoln Mills was to spawn confusion by allow-
ing each state to devise its own definitions of federal labor standards. An
employer or union operating in many states might suffer a substantial
penalty for doing interstate business-the activity that Congress is seeking
5 Cf. Hills & Co. v. Hoover, 220 U.S. 329 (1911).
0 Davis v. Rockton & Rion R.R., 65 F. Supp. 67 (W.D.S.C.), aff'd, 159 F.2d
291 (4th Cir. 1946); Pufahl v. Estate of Parkes, 299 U.S. 217 (1936) (dictum);
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) (dictum).
7 Ibid.
8 See, e.g., McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 227 (1958)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ; Blume & George, spra note 4, at 992-93; 53 CoLum. L.
REv. 68 (1953) ; 49 YALE L.J. 738 (1940).
9357 U.S. 221 (1958).
10 Jones Act claims must be joined with unseaworthiness actions if the seaman
is to prosecute both. Otherwise a recovery based on one of the rights bars prose-
cution of the other. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
"1353 U.S. 448 (1957).
12United Mine Workers v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959). The court in the present case attempted to dis-
tinguish that decision by saying, "the issue was which of two possible state statutes
should be applied, the question of the proper applicability of any state statute appar-
ently not being raised." Instant case at 913. The sixth circuit, by applying a state
statute of limitations, must have considered the latter question so settled as not to
require discussion.
'3 Instant case at 913.
14 The argument that uniformity in substantive regulation requires a uniform
limitations period can be made in any case involving a federal statute without limita-
tion. This argument, however, has been rejected in every area of private litigation
in which it has been made. See cases cited note 4 .upra.
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to protect-by having to conform his actions to many differing substantive
rules. On the other hand, uniformity in substantive regulation makes
variousness in limitations periods less burdensome. Predictability of limi-
tation is desirable only so that the prospective defendant will know how
long to provide for the contingency of litigation. 15 Even if the prospective
defendant operates in several states with differing limitations periods, he
need only anticipate litigation until the longest statute has run, and gen-
erally there will be relatively little disparity between the longest and the
shortest. A uniform limitations period, then, benefits prospective defend-
ants only if the uniform period is shorter than any of the applicable state
statutes.'0 And predictability only allows prospective plaintiffs' lawyers
to procrastinate for a predictable period of time; it is of no benefit to
prospective plaintiffs themselves. A lack of predictability imposes the
slight additional burden of forcing attorneys to file complaints promptly
after the cause of action has been discovered. Thus predictability deriving
from a uniform federal limitations rule would only slightly advance the
interests of the parties. Uniformity would also reduce forum shopping,
but this could be accomplished by a uniform federal rule for choice of the
applicable state statute of limitations.17  Furthermore, not only is the policy
of uniformity articulated in Lincoln Mills inapplicable to the present situ-
ation, but the remedy for lack of uniformity proposed by the district court
actually leads to increased uncertainty since the application of laches varies
from case to case.
In practice, much of the uncertainty surrounding the application of
state statutes of limitations is produced by the federal courts themselves.
Some courts have interpreted "the appropriate state limitations statute"
to mean the limitations statutes of the state in which they sit as in a
diversity case.' 8 Others apply the limitations statutes of the state in which
the federal cause of action arose. 19 The use of state "borrowing statutes"
has brought further confusion ° Forum shopping by plaintiffs 21 in order
to gain the benefit of a longer limitation period could be eliminated by the
adoption of a rule that the statute of limitations of the state having the most
substantial connection with the transaction should be applied.2 2 Plaintiffs
15 For example, by maintaining litigation reserves or keeping relevant files.
16 Plaintiffs, of course, would tend to institute suit in the forum which would
apply the longest statute of limitations. However, even when it is clear which state's
statute will be applied, there may be uncertainty as to which of that state's statutes
of limitations is applicable. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Meadow Creek Coal
Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
17 See notes 18-22 infra and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Bright v. Hobbs, 56 F. Supp. 723, 725 (D. Md. 1944) ; Williamson
v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 198, 203 (D. Del.), aff'd, 110 F.2d 15
(3d Cir. 1939).
19 Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947).
20 See, e.g., Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F. Supp. 1018
(S.D.N.Y. 1938).
21 See McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1958)
(Brennan, J. concurring); 49 YALE L.J. 738, 740 (1940).
22 For a general discussion of methods of choice of law in other substantive areas,
see Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
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would be bound to prosecute their claims within limits provided by the
statute of the state most closely connected with the facts of the case, and
would be prevented from seeking to avail themselves of the statute of a
forum which had no such connection. If federal courts adhere to the policy
of applying state statutes of limitations, they should attempt to define that
policy so that the same federal cause of action, regardless of the forum in
which it is brought, will be subject to the same limitation-that of the state
having the most substantial connection with the operative facts of the case.
Although this approach would require a difficult characterization of the
federal claim in order to determine the appropriate state limitations stat-
ute,23 it would eliminate much of the lack of uniformity that has been
associated with the application of state statutes to a federal claim.
Lincoln Mills should not be considered authority for overruling a solid
line of precedents extending back 67 years that seem to compel application
of state statutes of limitations 2 4 The departure from precedent in the
present case is unwarranted since -the very reasoning which the district
court advances to support its new solution betrays the superiority of the
traditional approach. State statutes of limitations should govern federal
labor claims until Congress creates a federal limitations period.
2 5
RATE REGULATION-ICC CANCELLATION OF RAILROAD RATES
COMPETITIVE WITH WATER CArIER RATES HELD INCONSISTENT
WITH CONGRESSIONAL POIOY EXPRESSED IN SECTION 5 OF TM
TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1958.
Two water carriers offering specialized "fishy-back" service' in com-
petition with railroads fixed rates five to ten per cent below corresponding
railroad boxcar rates. To meet this competition the railroads reduced
2 3 Cf. United Mine Workers v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
24 See note 4 supra. Once before a federal court construed a Supreme Court
predilection for uniformity in a narrow context-Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363 (1943)-as implicitly overruling the cases applying the Rules of Decision
Act. City of Grand Rapids v. McCurdy, 136 F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1943). Shortly
thereafter the Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional procedure. Cope v. Anderson,
331 U.S. 461 (1947).
25 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, granting the right to private antitrust suits, is
very similar to section 303b. Congress took forty years to provide a limitations
period for this section; during this time the courts were content to apply state statutes
of limitations. E.g., Suckow Borax Mines Consol. Inc. v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 185
F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950). The plaintiff in the instant case urged the court to analogize
to the limitation of this federal statute rather than to a state staute. Instant case
at 912. The district court rejected this suggestion on the ground that it would be
an inappropriate exercise of judicial power. Id. at 915. In any event, absent some
pressing need, creation of limitations periods is a legislative rather than a judicial
function.
' Sea-Land Service, Inc. transported demounted truck trailer bodies while Sea-
train Lines, Inc. carried railroad freight cars.
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selected trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) 2 rates to parity with the fishy-back
rates. The water carriers then challenged the railroad rates before the
ICC which was already considering the reduced fishy-back rates. After
extensive hearings the ICC ordered the railroads to maintain their rates
at a level six per cent above the water rates, concluding that the railroad
attempt to eliminate the water carrier differential constituted a form of
destructive competition 3 A three-judge district court, reviewing the ICC
action, held that the ICC had not made sufficient findings to support its
conclusion and that the Commission's interpretation of destructive com-
petition was broader than Congress intended. Enforcement of the ICC
order was enjoined. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. United States, 199
F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn. 1961), appeal docketed, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3364
(U.S. May 16, 1962) (No. 979).
The ICC has the power to regulate intermodal competition by setting
minimum rates. 4  The Commission's exercise of this power, however, is
limited by the policies articulated by Congress in the National Trans-
portation Policy 5 and in the various regulatory statutes.6 These policies
include the preservation of the inherent advantages of every mode of
transportation, maintenance of economically sound carriers at a reasonable
cost to the public, provision for the long term interests of national defense
and commerce, and prevention of discrimination and destructive competi-
tion. Prior to 1958 the ICC's policy had been to protect all modes of trans-
portation from reduction of traffic by requiring that rates be set high
enough to allow each mode of carriage to attract its "fair share" of the
traffic.7 In pursuing this policy the Commission inconsistently applied
the congressional guidelines; 8 in each case it generally chose the criterion
that would allow it to effectuate its policy of dividing the transportation
market according to its "fair share" standardP Only in one case-New
Automobiles in Interstate Commerce Q--did the Commission deviate sig-
nificantly from this policy; in another-Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United
States "--the Supreme Court intervened to lay down the rule that pro-
tection from diversion of traffic is not appropriate when the ICC has not
eliminated the possibility that the diverting carrier might have an inherent
2 Commonly known as "piggy-back." Either one truck trailer is carried on an
ordinary flatcar, or two trailers are transported on specially constructed cars.
3 Commodities-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23 (1960).
4 E.g., 41 Stat. 484 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §15(1) (1958).
4 54 Stat 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. Preamble (1958).
GE.g., 54 Stat. 939 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 907(h) (1958).
7 See FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION
353-60 (1961) ; NELSON, RAIROAD TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 432 (1959).
8 See H.R. REP. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1958); S. RE. No. 1647,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1958).
9 See generally FULDA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 339-70.
10259 I.C.C. 475 (1945).
11355 U.S. 83 (1957) (case involved entry rather than rates).
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advantage. Continued criticism of the ICC's paternalistic approach 12 led
Congress in its 1958 amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act to at-
tempt to restate the policy that should govern competitive rate regulation:
In a proceeding involving competition between carriers in dif-
ferent modes of transportation. . . the Commission, in determin-
ing whether a rate is lower than a reasonable minimum rate, shall
consider the facts and circumstances attending the movement of
traffic by the carrier or carriers to which the rate is applicable.
Rates of a carrier shall not be held up to a particular level to
protect the traffic of any other mode of transportation, giving
due consideration to the objectives of the national transportation
policy .... 13
Congressional deliberations on this amendment disclose disapproval of
the ICC's inconsistent protectionist policy and endorsement of the ap-
proach articulated in New Automobiles and Schaffer.14 The impetus then
of the 1958 amendment is toward freer competition; the ICC may protect
the traffic of competing carriers only if it can find justification for such
action in the National Transportation Policy. In practice, such justifica-
tion is likely to be found only when the rate reductions are injurious to
the proposing carrier or to a competitor with an inherent advantage or
when the reductions are part of a predatory campaign.15
The ICC finding that fishy-back was a lower cost service than trailer-
on-flatcar was admittedly not enough to fit its determination within the
inherent advantage exception of the 1958 amendment's stricture against
holding up rates to protect the traffic of another mode of transportation.
The Commission instead relied on another mandate of the National Trans-
portation Policy-the prohibition of destructive competition. The rail-
road reductions, it said, would inaugurate a spiral of rate reductions which
would result in the same rate differentials being established at a lower
level.10 The only effect would be to reduce the revenues of both the
railroads and the water carriers. This prediction may have been accurate;
there was testimony before the ICC that if the railroad reduction were ap-
proved, the water carriers were ready to lower their rates to reestablish
the differential.1 7 The railroads, however, were not necessarily the "ag-
gressors" in the rate war; the water carriers took the first step in estab-
lishing a differential below railroad rates. Therefore, in relying on the
12See generally PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMm. ON TRANSP. POLCY AND OR-
GANIZATION, REPORT ON FED. TRANSP. POLICY (1955).
1372 Stat. 572, 49 U.S.C. § 15(a) (3) (1958).
14 See H.R. REP. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1958); S. REP. No. 1647,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1958).
15 It is difficult to make rational findings concerning such National Transportation
Policy criteria as preservation of a transportation system sufficient to meet the needs
of national commerce and defense.
16 Commodities-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23, 41 (1960).
17 Ibid.
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destructive competition prohibition of the National Transportation Policy,
the Commission should have either eliminated or found justification for
the fishy-back differential, as the dissent by Commissioner Freas sug-
gested.' 8 Under the 1958 amendment the Commission could hold up
railroad rates to protect water carriage only if it found an inherent water
carrier advantage. To find an inherent advantage the ICC would have
had to make cost comparisons of the overall rate structures of the com-
peting modes of transportation.' This it failed to do; 2 0 indeed, the
Commission suggested that in a comparison of boxcar and fishy-back serv-
ices the railroads appeared to be the lower cost mode.2 ' In any event, it
was hardly legitimate for the Commission to approve the water carrier
differential without finding an inherent advantage, and then to maintain
the differential by characterizing railroad attempts to reestablish parity as
destructive competition.
The ICC's solicitude for the water carrier differential actually stemmed
from its belief that the fishy-back service could not attract traffic without
it.2 The district court, however, attacked the Commission's equation of
destructive competition with competitively compelled abandonment of
service.23 It reasoned that Congress could not have been so naive as to
endorse competition as a modus operandi in the transportation industry
without implicitly accepting a natural result of successful competition-
the elimination of the inefficient. Having failed to characterize the initial
water carrier reduced rates as the first step in a spiral of rate reduction,
the Commission could not so label the subsequent differential-eliminating
reduction of the railroads.
While the district court decision was thus grounded in part on the
conclusion that the ICC had failed to make requisite cost comparisons, the
court went on to criticize the Commission's methods of cost determination,
particularly the cost analyses applied to railroads in conjunction with
"value-of-service" pricing.24 Carriers are required to carry certain com-
modities-principally agricultural products and human beings-at rates
which often fall below out-of-pocket costs.2 5 To counterbalance these
deficits the carriers have been allowed to surcharge the movements of cer-
tain high priced commodities. 6 This pricing structure has had several
18 Commissioner Freas exposed what may have been the sub rosa motivation of
the majority-the feeling that water carriers are entitled, almost prima facie without
proof of cost advantage, to a rate differential. This feeling stems from a long history
of water carrier differentials on break-bulk service and railroad attempts to reduce
their rates in the face of established water carrier advantages. Id. at 52.
19 Instant case at 644-45.
20 Ibid.
2 1 Commodities-Pan American S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23, 44 (1960).
22 Id. at 44-45.
23 Instant case at 641.24 Instant case at 643-44. For further elaboration on the mechanics of ICC cost
evaluation see the appendices to the instant case and to the ICC decision, Commodities
-Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23, 54 (1960).
25 See instant case at 643; NEnsoN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 331.
26 See instant case at 643; Price, Railroads and Government Policy-A Legally
Oriented Study of an Economic Crisis, 48 VA. L. Rxv. 196, 245 (1962).
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debilitatory effects on the transportation industry,2 7 but its relevance to
the instant case is confined to its effect on the ICC cost evaluation process.
The district court charged that the ICC allowed value-of-service con-
siderations to influence two stages of its cost analysis.28 First, the ICC
attributes a fixed percentage of railroad overhead to out-of-pocket costs.
But the contribution to overhead of the deficit-creating commodities must
often be prorated among the profit making services. Thus the out-of-
pocket costs attributed to these latter services include costs which are
unrelated to the actual expenses of moving the traffic. Value-of-service
principles also effect the ICC's calculation of "fully-distributed costs," a
figure arrived at by prorating all railroad expenses-including those in-
curred by deficit producing services-among the profit making services. 29
However desirable it may be to recoup passenger and agricultural deficits
through higher profits on the movement of high value commodities, car-
riers should not be subjected to a competitive disadvantage by the inflation
of the "cost" of a profitable service for rate-making purposes. The orig-
inal deficits will father additional losses if fictitious cost determinations
prevent the carrier from competing to retain or augment its profitable
carriage.
The district court thus struck two blows for competition in the trans-
portation industry by narrowing the scope of the destructive competition
exception to the congressional policy of competition enunciated in the
1958 amendment and by criticizing the use in cost comparisons of expenses
unrelated to the service on which a carrier wished to lower rates.
2 7 The carriers price themselves out of the profitable markets because it becomes
more economical for the large shippers to develop their own fleet of private carriers.
The small shippers who cannot employ private carriage are forced to pay the high
common carrier rates, thus handicapping their efforts to compete effectively with the
large shippers. See Hearings on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries Before
the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, v. 1, at 90-91 (1957) (testimony of Professor Louis B. Schwartz).
28 The court also suggested that the ICC considered deviation from value-of-
service pricing to be a form of destructive competition. Instant case at 643.
29 Instant case at 647-48.
